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Abstract
We report the first gigahertz clocked decoy-protocol quantum key distribution (QKD). Record
key rates have been achieved thanks to the use of self-differencing InGaAs avalanche photodiodes
designed specifically for high speed single photon detection. The system is characterized with a
secure key rate of 1.02 Mbit/s for a fiber distance of 20 km and 10.1 kbit/s for 100 km. As the
present advance relies upon compact non-cryogenic detectors, it opens the door towards practical
and low cost QKD systems to secure broadband communication in future.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd Quantum Cryptography; 85.60.Gz Photo detectors; 85.60.Gw Photodiodes
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I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] promises a method for distributing digital
keys with unconditional security. With a sufficiently high key rate, QKD can reach its ulti-
mate goal to allow information-theoretically secret communication using the one-time pad
cipher, which has been ruled impractical due to the long-standing key distribution problem
[6]. Since its proposal [1] in 1984 and the subsequent proof-of-principle demonstration over
a free space distance of 32 cm with a system clock rate of 200 Hz in 1991 [2], experimental
QKD has advanced significantly in both the distribution distance [7, 8] (>100 km) and the
system clock rate [8, 9, 10] (≥1 GHz). It has already emerged from laboratories for field
tests in telecom network environments [11].
Security is often a victim of fast-paced advances. In high speed QKD demonstrations,
the security is commonly compromised due to the use of an attenuated laser source, which
inevitably emits pulses containing more than one photon, instead of the single photon source
of the original proposal. An eavesdropper (Eve) can launch a photon number splitting (PNS)
attack [12, 13] on these multi-photon pulses to gain information without introducing errors
in the distributed key. Fortunately, the security loophole due to the multi-photon pulses
can be overcome using the practical decoy protocol, developed independently by Lo et al.
[14, 15] and Wang [16] based on the original idea by Hwang [17]. By replacing a subset of the
signal pulses with less intense “decoy” pulses, Alice and Bob can detect an attempted PNS
attack through monitoring the quantum channel transmittances. As a simple modification
to the original BB84 protocol, the decoy protocol provides a robust solution to prevent
PNS attacks using only practical optical components. The decoy protocol promises long
distance operation because its key rate is linearly dependent on the channel loss, as for BB84
implemented with an ideal single photon source, compared to the quadratic dependence of
non-decoy BB84. Other protocols, such as coherent-one-way [18] and differential phase shift
[8, 19], are also effective against the PNS attack, but their unconditional security remains
an open question [20].
Decoy QKD has been demonstrated as a viable solution to achieve secure key distribution
across fiber links [21, 22, 23, 24]. However, the secure key rate, limited to 10 kbit/s for a
fiber distance of 20 km [24] and ∼10 bit/s for 100 km [22], is insufficient for practical use.
The limitation arises from the difficulty in counting frequently arriving single photons at a
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telecom wavelength. Recently, we demonstrated a simple self-differencing (SD) circuit [25]
that enables InGaAs avalanche photodiode (APD) to be used for high speed single photon
detection. Previously, we have successfully demonstrated the feasibility of using SD-APDs
in a gigahertz QKD system, achieving multi-Mbit/s sifted key rate using the standard BB84
protocol [10]. In the present paper, we build upon that first result by incorporating decoy
pulses into the standard BB84 protocol. This is the first report of gigahertz QKD with
a protocol that is unconditionally secure against all type of attacks on the transmitted
photons, including the PNS attack. Thanks to the high efficiency of the SD InGaAs APDs,
the secure key rate has been elevated by two orders of magnitude over previous best values,
and exceeds 1 Mbit/s over a fiber distance of 20 km for the first time. At 100 km, the secure
key rate is determined to be 10.1 kbit/s.
II. DECOY THEORY
In a decoy QKD system, Alice replaces a subset of signal pulses (average intensity µ
photons/pulse) randomly with weaker decoy pulses (average intensities ν1, ν2, · · ·). Individ-
ually, a decoy pulse is indistinguishable from a signal pulse. If Eve carries out a PNS attack,
by preferentially transmitting multi-photon pulses while blocking single photon pulses, she
will inevitably transmit a lower fraction of the decoy pulses as they statistically contain
fewer multi-photon pulses. By calculating the transmission and error rates for signal and
decoy pulses separately, Alice and Bob can place a bound on the information gained by Eve;
information which can then be removed in the privacy amplification stage.
In BB84, only pulses containing exactly one photon contribute to secure key distribution,
and the characteristics of these pulses can be rigorously bounded using the decoy protocol.
In a 3-state decoy protocol [15], where one signal state (µ) and two decoy states ( ν1, ν2)
are used, one can obtain a lower bound for the single photon transmittance, Q1, which
represents the joint probability that a signal pulse contains only one photon and the photon
is detected by Bob, using
Q1 ≥ Q
L
1 =
µ2e−µ
µν1 − µν2 − ν21 + ν
2
2
[Qν1e
ν1 −Qν2e
ν2 −
ν21 − ν
2
2
µ2
(Qµe
µ − Y L0 )]. (1)
The upper bound for the single photon quantum bit error rate (QBER), ε1, i.e., the QBER
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for those single photon pulses that are detected by Bob, can be obtained using
ε1 ≤ ε
U
1 =
εµQµe
µ − 1
2
Y L0
QL1 e
µ
, (2)
where µ, ν1 and ν2 are the average photon fluxes for signal and decoy pulses, Qx (x =
µ, ν1, ν2) is the transmission probability of a signal or decoy pulse, and εµ is the QBER for
signal state. Y L0 is the lower bound for the count probability for an empty pulse (0 photon
number), and can be obtained using
Y0 ≥ Y
L
0 =
ν1Qν2e
ν2 − ν2Qν1e
ν1
ν1 − ν2
(3)
With QL1 and ε
U
1 available, the secure key rate can be determined using
RSecure =
1
2
Nµ{−QµfECH2(εµ) +Q
L
1 [1−H2(ε
U
1 )]}/t (4)
where Nµ is the total number of the signal pulses sent by Alice, and t is the QKD session
time. fEC is the error correction efficiency and H(x) = −x log2(x) − (1 − x) log2(1 − x) is
the binary Shannon entropy. We use fEC = 1.10 in this paper based on previous results of
our error correction module [21].
III. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
Figure 1 shows a schematic diagram of the decoy QKD setup. Photons are generated
by a 1.55 µm pulsed laser operating at 1.036 GHz. The three intensity levels required for
signal, decoy and near vacuum pulses are created using a fiber-optic intensity modulator.
The quantum information is transmitted in the phase of the photons, with the phase en-
coding/decoding optics based on an asymmetric fiber Mach-Zender interferometer (AMZI).
Off-the-shelf optical components were used to construct the AMZIs. The AMZI pair have
matching time differences, of 440 ps in this case, to ensure that single photon interference
takes place at the exit of the second AZMI. Fine phase control is achieved through a fiber
stretcher (not shown in Fig. 1) placed in one of Bob’s AMZI arms [7, 26]. The AMZIs are
carefully insulated from the environment to achieve sufficient stability to allow QKD to take
place. The optical pulses are strongly attenuated to the desired levels before leaving the
sender’s apparatus, with the intensity level of the pulses monitored using a beam-splitter and
optical power meter. Dispersion shifted single mode fiber is used as the quantum channel,
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with an attenuation loss of 0.20 dB/km. Note that standard single mode fiber SMF-28 can
also be used as the quantum channel, as previously reported [10], but fiber chromatic dis-
persion must be carefully compensated for long fibers (> 65 km). A polarization controller
at Bob’s side recovers the polarization alignment before his AMZI. Each photon detection
event is recorded with a unique time-stamp by time-tagging electronics, and these events
are used by Alice and Bob to generate a secure key.
IV. SELF-DIFERENCING InGaAs AVALANCHE PHOTODIODES
InGaAs APDs are used for single photon detection at a clock rate of 1.036 GHz, cooled
to –30 ◦C using a thermoelectric cooler. We operate these devices in SD mode [25], as
shown in Fig. 2(a). The raw APD output is processed by an inserted SD circuit to remove
the periodic capacitive response before detection by the discrimination electronics. After
the SD avalanche signals are clearly identifiable from the background noise, as shown in
Fig. 2(b). The smallest separation between avalanches is 2 ns, which corresponds to 2 clock
periods as expected for a perfect SD, suggesting an ultrashort detector dead time. Such a
short dead time is three orders of magnitude less than typical values for conventional gated
mode InGaAs APDs. We attribute this to the reduced avalanche charge, being 0.17 pC
per avalanche, as inferred from the photo-current dependence on photon count in the linear
regime. The detector biases were set to achieve a detection efficiency of 10% with a dark
count probability of 6.8× 10−6 per gate.
The SD APD has excellent timing performance, as shown in Fig. 2(c). The detector
is biased active for a 0.48-ns gate in each clock cycle. We found a sharp distribution of
photon arrivals at each gate, which can be fitted well with a Gaussian lineshape with a full
width at half maximum (FWHM) of 50 ps, as shown in Fig. 2(d). A significant gap between
adjacent peaks prevents any ambiguity in assigning clock cycles to the received photons and
hence the bit value. In comparison, InGaAs APDs under conventional mode display much
poorer timing performance (FWHM: 370 ps), as shown in Fig. 2(d). Moreover, adjacent
photon peaks overlap at this photon arrival frequency, introducing ambiguity in assigning
the clock cycle for photons received. Typically, such a problem can be reduced by applying
a small time window [8] to reject the most ambiguous photons, but such a solution not only
reduces the detector efficiency but also adds to the complexity of the system. In light of
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such observations, we believe that SD APDs are preferable for applications, such as QKD,
where photons arrive at regular intervals, even if improvements in InGaAs APD technology
allow continuous operation in the future.
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We implemented the decoy protocol with three different intensity levels: µ, ν1, ν2 (µ >
ν1 > ν2), with duty cycles of 0.80, 0.16 and 0.04 respectively. The signal pulses (µ) are used
for key generation, while those of intensity ν1 and ν2 are used as decoy pulses to characterize
the quantum channel. The most efficient decoy protocol requires a vacuum state (ν2 = 0).
In the experiment, ν2 is set to be 29 dB lower than the signal pulse (µ) due to the finite
extinction ratio of the intensity modulator. Numerical simulations are used to determine
signal and decoy intensities for an optimal secure key rate.
We first performed QKD across a fiber distance of 20 km, the most important dis-
tance for an optimal linear QKD network [20]. Average photon fluxes of [µ=0.55, ν1=0.10,
ν2=7.6×10
−4] were used. The high clock rate allows accumulation of sufficient photon events
from a short session to account for statistical fluctuations. During an uninterrupted session
lasting 2.3 s, a total of 7.91 × 106 sifted signal bits were accumulated with a QBER of
2.53%. Based on parameters obtained experimentally, we are able to calculate single photon
pulse characteristics using Eqns. (1 – 3). In order to account for the finite key size, we use
statistical upper and lower bounds calculated at ten standard deviations for experimental
parameters, to give a conservative bound on the key rate. These parameters and results are
summarized in Table 1. The achieved secure key rate of 1.02 Mbit/s is remarkable, being
two orders of magnitude higher than the previous record of 10 kbit/s [24] for an uncondi-
tionally secure QKD protocol. We believe that this is the first time the secure key rate has
exceeded 1 Mbit/s for any QKD protocol for this fiber length or longer. Combined with the
one-time pad cipher, such a key rate is sufficient to allow secure encryption of broadband
communication, for example secure video links [27].
Figure 3 shows the fiber distance dependence of the raw and secure key rates, and the
QBER. The same parameters as for the 20 km experiment are used for all the distances
studied. Theoretical simulations of the key rates are also shown in Fig. 3. The measured
QBER is dominated by the detector afterpulse noise [10] for fiber distances less than 60 km.
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The raw key rates as well as the secure key rates are in good agreement with the simulation.
They decrease exponentially with fiber attenuation at 0.20 dB/km, apart from for short fibers
(≤20km). At 5.6 km, the secure key rate is 1.65 Mbit/s, noticeably less than expected, due
to the count rate limitation imposed by the time-tagging electronics [28]. The secure key
rates are determined to be 446 and 166 kbit/s for 40 and 60 km of fibers respectively.
For fiber lengths beyond 60 km, the detector dark count noise deteriorates the QKD
performance, causing the secure key rate to fall faster than the fiber loss and eventually
preventing key formation at a fiber distance of ∼110 km, as simulated in Fig. 3. At 100.8 km
of fiber, the QBER is measured to be 4.6%, which is still sufficiently low for efficient key
formation. The raw key rate is reduced to 257 kbit/s due to the fiber attenuation, and
correspondingly the QKD session time becomes noticeably longer at 16.5 s, in order to
accumulate sufficient photon detection events to reduce statistical fluctuations. Including
the effects of finite key length, a secure key rate of 10.1 kbit/s is achieved. This is a
significant improvement over the previous records, where the key rate at an equivalent level
of security is around ∼10 bit/s [22]. The key rate is also more than 10 times greater than
obtained in a recent high-speed QKD experiment [30], where a key rate of 0.78–0.82 kbit/s
was estimated asymptotically using the decoy analysis method for a 97-km fiber link. The
high key rate obtained here is a significant step towards the realization of long distance
information-theoretically secure communication.
Finally, we would like to point out that there still remain challenges to overcome before
realizing a complete gigahertz QKD system. These include remote synchronization, high
speed error correction and privacy amplification, and high speed random number generation
[29]. Gigahertz random number generators, which do not exist presently, are particularly
important, as the security of the QKD relies upon Alice and Bob’s ability to randomly
modulate each optical pulse individually.
VI. CONCLUSION
In summary, we have demonstrated high key rate QKD with gigahertz-clocked InGaAs
APDs using the decoy protocol, which generates keys with unconditional security. A signifi-
cant leap in the secure key rate has been obtained, thanks to high performance SD detectors
and the effectiveness of the decoy protocol. With this advance, QKD is now practical for
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realizing high bandwidth information-theoretic secure communication. This is not only an
exciting advance for cryptography, but also for the maturing field of quantum information
science.
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TABLE I: Summary of parameters and results for the 20-km decoy QKD experiment. 10 standard
deviations are also shown for Qµ, Qν1 , Qν2 and εµ.
Parameter Value Parameter Value
Fiber length 20.06 km Qµ (8.680 ± 0.025) × 10
−3
µ 0.55 Qν1 (1.970 ± 0.025) × 10
−3
ν1 0.10 Qν2 (4.470 ± 0.225) × 10
−4
ν2 7.5 × 10
−4 εµ (2.530 ± 0.009)%
Prob.(µ : ν1 : ν2) 0.80:0.16:0.04 Q
L
1 4.81 × 10
−3
t 2.3 s εL1 2.10%
fEC 1.10 RSecure 1.02 Mbit/s
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FIG. 1: Schematic of QKD system. [P] denotes a phase modulator, [B] a polarising beam split-
ter/combiner, [A] an attenuator, [M] an optical power meter, [C] a polarization controller and [D]
InGaAs APD. All the modulating optics are driven by stand-alone gigahertz pattern generators
with pre-loaded pseudo-random patterns.
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FIG. 2: Self-difference mode operation of an InGaAs APD. (a) Schematic for an APD in self-
differencing mode. [S] is a 50:50 electrical signal splitter, [D] a subtractive combiner; Co-axial cables
connecting the splitter and combiner are made with precise lengths so that the time delay between
them corresponds to one APD gating clock period. The APD raw output signal is dominated by the
periodic capacitive response, as shown in the inset. (b) A SD output recorded by an oscilloscope.
The arrows indicate well discriminated avalanches. (c) Histogram of photon arrival times obtained
using the output of the SD circuit. (d) A comparison of histograms of photon arrivals obtained
with the same APD under conventional gated Geiger mode operation (blue line) or SD mode
(black line). For both measurements, the photon detection efficiency was set to 10%. The red
circles represent a Gaussian fit for histograms obtained with the SD circuit, giving a full width at
half maximum of 50 ps.
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set to 5% (corresponding 10% of detector efficiency), detector dark count rate of 6.8 × 10−6 and
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